The Gutter Grunt’s Anti-BS Blog

The CDC is falsifying the H1N1 data it presents on its website.  They are trying to make the public believe that the weekly body count is 75, when it is actually hundreds.  They are trying to make the public believe that the cumulative body count is considerably less than it is — exact number, who knows?  They are playing hide-the-ball with the data.

These are serious allegations, but they are too complex to explain here.  Besides, I can’t paste the CDC graphs I need to prove the point.

I know what you’re thinkin’ — the ole’ Gutter Grunt is cooking up another conspiracy theory. Over at the mother site I have gone all out and published the CDC’s own data and statements.  I show you their falsified data, and I give you all the links.   You can see it here, and then make up your own mind.

Tags: H1N1 // Add Comment »

I lived in New Zealand for about a decade, and so things from and about NZ tend to catch my eye.  This one sure did – it’s a lecture given in 2005 by Canterbury University history professor, Geoffery Rice. Prof Rice published a book about the 1918 flu; it’s called Black November.  This lecture is a synopsis of his book as it relates to the experiences of this small city in NZ during Nov. 1918.

The complete lecture is posted on FluTrackers.  http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=19396

If you want to get an idea of what the near future looks like, this is mandatory reading.   For those who keep asking what the “worst case” scenario looks like; it looks like this.  And for the brain-dead mouth monkeys who keep reminding us that the present H1N1 is “mild” because so few people are dying, the population death rate in C’church was “only” 0.5%.

Prof. Rice’s lecture is half about how Christchurch handled the 1918 flu and half about NZ’s current pandemic plans.  To me, it brings home two important lessons: first, how fast the second wave of the 1918 flu came on and ravaged communities, and, second, how utterly poorly prepared we are to deal with a similar pandemic today, both at the personal level and at the governmental level.

Just some background for those of you who have not yet been to NZ.  Christchurch is the main city on the South Island.  It’s on the east coast, about halfway down the island in an area called Canterbury.  In 1918 it was pretty well isolated from the world, and even from the main cities of NZ, Auckland near the top of the North Island, and Wellington, at the bottom of the North Island.

Remember, November is late spring in NZ; schools are just about to close for the summer holiday, which is what Prof. Rice is referring to when he talks about the longest school holiday ever.

To the extent that Santayana’s quip is true about learning from the past or repeating it, we are in a world of trouble because we have, apparently, not learned anything from the 1918 experience.

Here are a few excerpts from the lecture – remember this lecture was given three years before the present pandemic broke out.  Much of it sounds like he’s describing the last 6 months:

“One thing that interested me about the 1918 flu was the huge impact it must have had on young families, because that 1918 flu was a bit of a freak among influenza pandemics. Influenza normally only kills the very young or the very old. But the so-called Spanish Flu of 1918 preferred young adults in the prime of life, aged between 25 and 45. We still don’t know exactly why it behaved this way. Now that we know its genetic structure, that H1N1 virus looks very ordinary. It was actually closer to swine flu than avian flu, but that’s another story.”

“A lot of people here in Christchurch were talking about influenza during October 1918, but they were in the tail-end of the mild first wave of the pandemic. There was a serious flu outbreak among the boarders at Christ’s College in October with 127 boys ill, some with pneumonia, but there were no deaths. A dozen nurses at Christchurch Hospital came down with flu, and there was a lot of absenteeism at the Post Office and among tramway staff.”

[The second wave of the flu started in C’church on Nov11, 1918.] “At Christchurch Hospital flu admissions doubled in three days to reach 145 by 14 November, with half of the nurses down with flu. The situation was grim, but it was never the complete shambles that some critics later alleged. The hospital was lucky that Dr Fox, the medical superintendent, had caught the mild flu in October, and seemed immune to the severe second wave. Later in November he collapsed from overwork and exhaustion, but there was someone else to take his place.”

“By mid-November Christchurch was really in the grip of the flu. So many people took to their beds that shops and offices and factories either adopted reduced hours or closed completely. One man I interviewed said he stood in Colombo Street at the height of the flu and he could have fired a gun either way and would not have hit a soul. The streets were deserted and the whole city became like a ghost town.”

“St John Ambulance had just two motor ambulances in Christchurch in 1918, so the city council requisitioned vans from drapery firms like Beaths and Ballantynes to collect stretcher cases. The Canterbury Automobile Association was one of the largest and most active in NZ in 1918, and no fewer than 264 members offered their cars, and themselves as drivers. The central bureau allotted half a dozen cars to each depot. At first it was all a bit chaotic, but the idea of the block system was to prevent overlapping and waste of time and effort. The doctors were each assigned to a block and asked to go to the houses where flu cases were found, and most of Christchurch’s doctors were happy to work within this system.”  [Hullo?  Has the government today made any plans at all to get doctors to houses where the sick will be?  No.  It will be the same lame system we have now where you go to ER and sit there for hours until you are seen or die.]

“After the peak of deaths on the 19th, the death toll dropped away sharply and was down to single figures by the start of December. The worst mortality had occupied just three weeks. . . The final death toll for Christchurch was 458. That gives a death rate of 4.9 per thousand, or just under half of one per cent. Wellington was nearly 8 per thousand, and Auckland 7.6 per thousand. Dunedin got off quite lightly, with only 3.9 per thousand. Christchurch’s death rate was well below the national average for the European population of 5.8 per thousand.”

“Once the initial medical emergency was over, of finding the worst pneumonic cases and getting them to hospital, there was a different sort of crisis facing the city. There were thousands of people recovering from the flu, who were still too weak to look after themselves. . . That was a nasty virus in 1918: survivors told me that it left them feeling as weak as a kitten for a long time afterwards. Some people had lost all their hair and fingernails from the high fevers, or had huge nosebleeds or vomited blood. They were the lucky ones who survived. But the survivors now had to be fed. Relief workers found many households with empty cupboards. In those days before any unemployment benefit, with the breadwinner off work, there were no wages coming in and no food being bought.”

Tags: H1N1 // Add Comment »

I’m not going to crunch any numbers in this H1N1 post.  Nope, all verbal.  In fact, I’m not even going to write this post.  I’m going to lift it all from recent US government sources.
Here are excerpts from the CDC and from Homeland Security’s  Water and Wastewater Annex to the Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources. (“Annex”)  You can download the whole W/W/ Annex here: http://wwn-online.com/Whitepapers/2009/08/Flu-Pandemix-Annex/Asset.aspx

Bold added. [My comments in brackets.]

___________________________________

CDC – http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/pandplan.html
Not dated.

[Note: these are CDC planning assumptions, not predictions.  I’m not sure what the difference is. Why would one assume something that is not predicted?  I do not assume it’s gonna’ rain when the forecast says “sunny.”]
1.1. Planning Assumptions

1.1.1. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal.

1.1.2. Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an imminent pandemic. [Thanks.  I think we’re already past that point.]

1.1.3. The clinical disease attack rate will likely be 30% or higher in the overall population during the pandemic. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40%) and decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20% will become ill during a community outbreak.

1.1.3.1. Some persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and develop immunity to subsequent infection.

1.1.4. Of those who become ill with influenza, 50% will seek outpatient medical care.

1.1.4.1. With the availability of effective antiviral drugs for treatment, this proportion may be higher in the next pandemic.

1.1.5. The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus. Estimates differ about 10-fold between more and less severe scenarios. Two scenarios are presented based on extrapolation of past pandemic experience (Table 1). Planning should include the more severe scenario.

1.1.5.1. Risk groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with certainty but are likely to include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, and persons with chronic medical conditions.

1.1.6. Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic. [Thanks for that.]
1.1.6.1. In a severe pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection may reach 40% during the peak weeks of a community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before and after the peak.

1.1.6.2. Certain public health measures (closing schools, quarantining household contacts of infected individuals, “snow days”) are likely to increase rates of absenteeism.

1.1.7. The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) for influenza is approximately 2 days.

1.1.8. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for up to one day before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the first 2 days of illness. Children usually shed the greatest amount of virus and therefore are likely to post the greatest risk for transmission.

1.1.9. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other people.

1.1.10. In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak will last about 6 to 8 weeks.

1.1.11. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the country) of illness could occur with each wave lasting 2-3 months. Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.

___________________________________

CDC – http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/pandplan.html
Not dated.

Table 1. Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios*

Characteristic                    Moderate (1958/68-like)    Severe (1918-like)

Illness                             90 million (30%)                90 million (30%)

Outpatient medical care     45 million (50%)                45 million (50%)

Hospitalization                  865,000                           9,900,000

ICU care                           128,750                           1,485,000

Mechanical ventilation           64,875                             745,500

Deaths                             209,000                          1,903,000

*Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note that these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during the 20th century pandemics.
[Note that CDC is saying moderate and severe models are predicting the same numbers of people infected, with the severe being more lethal.  Ironically, unless deaths reach into the tens of millions, the lethality of H1N1 likely has little or no impact on how much social disruption there will be.]

___________________________________

W/W Annex, page 3
Aug13.2009

Industries in every sector of the American economy will experience influenza pandemic impacts. The Water and Wastewater sector will play a key role in keeping one of America’s most crucial and life-saving services operational. Shortages and disruptions to basic services, functions, and national infrastructure may cause localized challenges for communities. Effective coordination with public safety officials and community leaders will facilitate the integration of water and wastewater utilities into community emergency operations planning.

Unlike other disasters, an influenza pandemic will not directly physically damage infrastructure. However, planners need to assess the indirect impact that worker absenteeism due to the influenza pandemic will have on reduced or delayed normal maintenance on essential equipment and may have on emergency repair or equipment replacement. In addition, an influenza pandemic’s impact on the supply chain (i.e. “just-in-time” delivery, warehousing, and logistics) could have a significant impact on the ability to get replacement equipment as well as essential parts and supplies such as valves, pipes, motor starter centers and hydrants to repair and maintain equipment. Contingency plans should address the potential lack of equipment replacements and parts and supplies for an extended period for all primary and supporting essential equipment.

___________________________________

W/W Annex, page 5
Aug13.2009

A pandemic influenza “wave” may linger in a community for six to eight weeks, and nationally for approximately 12 weeks. The negative impacts on individuals, businesses, and the nation from the illness and disease mitigation strategies will have an effect over a much greater duration than other typical disaster scenarios. A severe influenza pandemic may disrupt access to your essential materials and supplies necessary to function for up to 12 weeks. Utilities should explore their supply chains, beginning with internal storage capacity and tracking along the network to the source of the materials. Given an increased reliance on “just- in-time” delivery and the potential impacts that could affect your supply chain, you may need to stockpile chemicals (e.g., coagulants, pH adjustors, and disinfectants), fuels, lubricants, filters, repair parts, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (e.g., masks, gloves, hand sanitizer) on site or locally or ensure availability by making other contingency plans.

___________________________________

W/W Annex, page 6
Aug13.2009

A severe influenza pandemic may generate extended absences for essential workers that might affect you and your supply chain. During an influenza pandemic the actual level of workforce absenteeism could approach 40 percent. To complicate matters, the disease will strike randomly among employees from operation managers to front-line workers as well as employee families

___________________________________

W/W Annex, page 8
Aug13.2009

When a pandemic influenza strikes, it will affect nearly every sector of our society, not just health care, but energy, transportation systems, workplaces, schools, public safety, and more. Successful preparedness and response will require a coordinated nation-wide effort, including Federal, State, local governments and most importantly the private sector. To facilitate a swift response and recovery to a pandemic influenza outbreak, the Water and Wastewater Sector must identify and be able to sustain its essential interdependencies within and across sectors. Interdependencies requiring advanced coordination include support from other utilities, businesses, government agencies, as well as essential goods and services, including, but not limited to, electricity, fuel, telecommunications and transportation.

___________________________________

W/W Annex, page 9
Aug13.2009

To reduce impacts from a pandemic influenza outbreak, Federal, State, tribal, and local government authorities, in addition to private entities, may implement a variety of strategies, including: voluntary isolation; voluntary home quarantine; school closures; and social distancing of adults in the community and workplace. The public health and social distancing strategies may ultimately contain the disease and may reduce the risk of infection and loss of life, but they also will have significant consequences for utilities and private sector businesses that must be managed carefully.

Tags: Uncategorized, H1N1 // Add Comment »

In my last post, July 25th, I ran a few numbers from the CDC and the UK Ministry of Health and came to the conclusion that the next 6 months or so could see 800,000 US deaths from swine flu. This would be the largest fatal event in US history. The prediction was based on an infection rate of 40% and a kill rate of 0.7%. If either of these numbers is off, the guess is off.

Since then I have been scanning the data-horizon to see if any information is coming to light that would suggest my conclusions are way off. I get data primarily from the European CDC, which gives a daily update of European and world data. http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/Default.aspx

I also check out the US CDC for weekly reports. http://cdc.gov/h1n1flu/update.htm . And I find that SwineFlu.org has some very worthwhile on-going discussions that often lead to other sources of data.

Putting the bottom line here near the top, I cannot say that I have found any compelling reasons to modify my predictions, either up or down, but I am having trouble believing that 40% of the population will become infected.

You only need 2 numbers to follow what’s going on — one number represents how efficiently the virus spreads, and the other represents how efficiently the virus kills the people it does infect. Unfortunately, these numbers are all over the board.

The first number is generally presented as the percent of people in the population that get infected. The complication is that this can be expressed as the total number of people ever infected divided by the total population, or the total number of people presently infected divided by the total population. Mostly, the total infection rate is given. At the present, the number that seems to be the most accepted is that H1N1 will infect 40% of the total population over the entire course of the pandemic.

The killing efficiency of a virus is the second number of interest. One would think that the most dangerous virus is the one that kills with 100% efficiency. Not true — sort of. Influenza is a disease that runs its course very fast – days or a couple weeks, as opposed to, say, HIV, which takes years to kill the person. So if a flu virus kills 100% of the people it infects, it is killing off people faster than it can spread. It ends up as a flash in the pan. From a Darwinian point of few, such a virus is a loser.

A far more dangerous flu virus is one that kills only a moderate fraction of people it infects. The walking infected then spread the disease around. That’s H1N1.

There are two ways to quantify killing efficiency. One is the number of dead per capita. The other is the number of dead per infected persons. This second number is called the Case Fatality Rate (CFR). It is the most widely used. A CFR of 20% for instance says that the virus is killing 20% of those it infects and the remaining 80% are still able to transmit the disease. Sometimes CFR includes a time period, such as 25% per year. I don’t see that being done much with H1N1.

In my previous calculations I used a CFR of 0.7%. I got this by dividing the total US H1N1 deaths by the total cases reported as of July 25th. (Based on the latest available data, Aug10.09, the US CFR has increased to 1.2%. The CDC stopped reporting cases as of Aut10.09, so it’s no longer possible to track the number for the US.)

The European CDC has been reporting a much lower CFR for Europe – about 0.15%, or 10x lower than the US. I think the best explanation for the discrepancy is that the US is underestimating the number of cases, which results in an overestimation of CFR. Currently in Australia the CFR is running about 0.4%.

At any rate, we have a CFR range of 0.15% to 1.2%. This is interesting because estimates of past H1N1 pandemics range from 0.1% (1957 — a mild pandemic) to 2.5% (1918 — a deadly pandemic).

Compare the H1N1 figures to the estimates of avian flu (H5N1) CFR of 14% to 60% and you’ll understand why avian flu is such a scary prospect. http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/62/6/555

The 1918 H1N1 pandemic ran its course in three waves or peaks. In terms of deaths, the second peak, P2, was by far the worse. And so it is very significant that the CFR for P2 was 2.5%, while the CFR for P1 was only 0.5%, which is not a bad estimate for our present CFR. For some reason the killing efficiency of the 1918 virus increased 4-5x over the course of a couple months. The CFR for P3 dropped to about 1.5%.

In these terms, the goal of Tamiflu is to reduce the CFR. Tamiflu doesn’t keep anyone from getting the virus, it just shortens the course and, presumably, prevents deaths.

Of course, killing efficiency doesn’t tell the whole story. If the CFR of a virus is 50% but only 2 people get infected, then the situation is very dire for one of them, but not for the whole population. The first big question as to H1N1 is what percentage of its victims will die. The second big question is how many victims will there be.

I have no idea where the currently proposed number of 40% infection rate comes from. If you look at the current reported numbers of infections in different countries, none of them are above 1%. While I have no problem with the prediction that H1N1 could kill 2% of its targets, I just can’t get my mind around the possibility that the infection rate will go from 0.05% to 40% over the next few months.

BTW, vaccines work to decrease infection rate. They don’t help people who are infected to survive, but they reduce the number of infected people. So the pharmacological strategy is that Tamiflu lowers CFR and the vaccine lowers the transmission rate.

And so the world waits . . . with fingers crossed.

Tags: H1N1 // Add Comment »

As reported in my last post, in early July the UK Health Secretary, Andy Burnham, publicly predicted that Britain could see 100,000 new cases of swine flu PER DAY by September.   Unless you monitor the UK media, you weren’t going to see that startling figure.  So far as I know, the US media have virtually ignored it.  The CDC sat on it, too, until yesterday, Friday, Jul24.09, when CDC spokesman Tom Skinner disclosed in an interview with AP that the swine flu infection rate in the US was expected to reach 40%.

40%.  Ho hum.  Big deal.  According to media reports, H1N1 has been characterized as fairly “mild,” as these things go.  We keep reading that the symptoms are mild and that the few fatalities that have occurred have mostly been in individuals with “underlying” health problems.  But if you’re willing to do the numbers, that CDC prediction of 40% infection rate is a pretty good reason to poop yourself.  Grab the TP and I’ll show you some of those numbers:

Two other figures from the CDC are required to calculate expected total US deaths in the next few months.  As of Jul23.09 the total reported cases in the US is 43,771.  Total fatalities: 302.  So the reported fatality rate as per infections so far is 0.7%, which is actually on the moderate to high side for past flu pandemics.

Based on this fatality rate we can calculate the chance that a presently non-infected person will die from H1N1.  First calculate the total expected cases in the US, which is 40% of 300 million total population => 120 million Americans will become infected.  Of those, 0.7% will die – that’s 840,000, which is 0.3% of the total population.  OK, not too bad, you’ve got 997 chances out of 1000 of surviving this monster.

Doesn’t sound too bad until you realize that 840,000 is over twice the number of Americans killed in WWII, and about 1.5 times the combined number of Americans and Confederates killed during the Civil War.  Taking into account the changes in population, that 0.3% is about the same figure as your chances of dying in WWII as of 1941 (400,000 deaths out of a population of about 131 million) and 10x higher than your chances of getting killed in Vietnam as of 1965  (58,000 dead out of a population of about 200 million).

Still no big deal?  After all, you were a 3 year old female in 1965 so your chances of dying in Vietnam were really O%.  How about some predicted daily rates – hold on to your seats.  I don’t know what a good figure would be for the duration of this flu season, but according to Google Flu Trends, flu seasons last about 6 months.  180 days.  Based on that estimate, the average new cases rate in the US will be 666,666 new cases PER DAY.  The average death rate will be 4,667 PER DAY, which is about 21 times higher than the average daily death rate of American servicemen in WWII (~220/day) and about 1550 times higher than the average daily death rate for American servicemen during the Vietnam War (~3/day).

Note that although these rates are extrapolated from the single 40% infection rate the CDC put out yesterday, the calculated 666,666 daily infection rate is in fair agreement with the UK figure, given that the population of the UK is about 1/5 that of the US.  Oddly, the UK figure for their expected death rate of 40 per day is way low.  Extrapolating from these US figures, the UK should expect more than 200 deaths per day from swine flu.

Even if these estimates are waaaay off, this situation is still very serious, and the US government is doing a piss poor job of warning the public about what is coming.  Basically, all we’ve had is an off-the-cuff comment by a CDC spokesman during an interview with a news reporter.  Think about it: twice as many Americans could die between November and April from swine flu than died in the whole 5 years of WWII.  Hello?  Wolf?  Chris?  Katie?  Barack? Anybody home???? There’s a story here . . .

You have to go to the UK media to get a sense of the seriousness of this mess. For instance, the UK has warned its commercial sector to be prepared for a 20% illness rate for the duration of the flu season.  Obviously, everybody is not going to call in sick with swine flu the same week.  Over the next 6 months there will be a rolling disabled list in all sectors.  And because this virus is  targeting the 15 - 44 year old crowd, just keeping the country running is going to be problematic.  Look at the flight controllers.  The FAA is having trouble as it is keeping enough flight controllers at their screens.  We’ve already had one situation this year in which air space over North Carolina had to be shut down so an over-worked flight controller could take a break.  What happens when 20% of all cops, firemen, air traffic controllers, truck drivers, grocery store employees, utilities workers, teachers, and military personnel call in sick over a 6 month period?  Shouldn’t the government start getting the public prepared for these possibilities?

The health officials so far seem to be hanging all their hope on technology to bend these numbers away from disaster.  Tamiflu and vaccines, to be specific.  But the chances of Tamiflu containing this virus are nil.  There will be a large population of drug-resistant virus that the drug won’t touch, and that fraction will expand rapidly.  The more Tamiflu you administer, the less effective it will be.  As for the vaccine, NPR reported on July 20th that production of the H1N1 vaccine is not going well — just at the point in time when we need it to be going very well.  Doris Bucher, of the NY Medical College, whose lab created the pandemic virus seed strain from which vaccines are produced, told NPR that manufacturers are getting very poor yields.  Pass the TP, please.

The meta-message from the silence we get from the CDC, your president, and your government is that you’re going to have to look after yourselves.  Personally, I’m watching the Obama girls.  If their daddy takes them out of school and quietly moves them to safety in the next few weeks – such as the post-flu season Southern Hemisphere – then we will know the shoe is about to drop.

Tags: H1N1 // Add Comment »

July 05, 2009

Well, folks my blood pressure peaked again this week, and not because of Pailin’s resignation.

Did you see the UK Health Secretary’s pig-flu warning? Argentina’s weekly figures? The New England Journal of Medicine?

The UK is predicting 100,000 new cases of pig flu PER DAY by the end of August — that’s August THIS YEAR. As in 60 DAYS hence!!!! (Why don’t they say “by September” instead of “by the end of August”?)

They are predicting 40 deaths a DAY by “the end of September;” i.e. by October. Here’s a link:
The 40 deaths number is way, way low relative to the new cases number — it’s only 0.04%. I believe CDC estimates for flu death rates generally range from 0.5% to 2.0% of cases. Even the lower figure of 0.5% would mean 500 deaths per day in the UK. Don’t even want to think about the upper figure. Don’t even want to think about the US figures will be, but based strictly on population, the UK number converts to 500,000 new cases a day for the US.

According to the Independent article above, the UK govt has already cut off treatment for infected folks. If you have symptoms, you have to quarantine yourself and call the pharmacy, which can’t really do anything but send aspirin.

And you know how governments are. If the UK government is sending out this message, . . . well, you know it must be 5x worse than what they tell the public. Most governments, including Obama, are keeping the lid on this, but it’s coming up on us real quick now. I’m just glad the US has Homeland Security to get the country through this. Ha, ha, ha, ha. BTW, I wonder where Michael Brown is.

But the bad news continued last week . . . in Argentina, the number of new cases jumped from 1000 the previous week to 100,000 last week.
And there was more . . . the New England Journal of Medicine published the first analysis of the pig-flu cases in Mexico. This is probably the most detailed analysis of the new H1N1 demographics so far.

Similarities with the 1918 pig-flu pandemic that killed 50 million people (no one seems to have a number for the pigs) are what makes today’s pandemic scary. The 1918 pandemic also started off as little more than a whimper in the N. Hemisphere spring, smoldered during the summer, and exploded during the flu season. In 1918, the victims, both in terms of infections and deaths, were disproportionately young adults.

The Mexican study shows the same pattern. Normally, the bulk of seasonal flu infections (60%) and almost all deaths are distributed among those younger than 5 and older than 60, in fact, mostly older than 80. The age group 15- 44 represents only 8% of the seasonal cases. But the pig-flu cases in Mexico, 64% of the cases were in the 15-44 age range, which is similar to what people think the 1918 flu looked like. There are no accurate numbers for 1918.

Tags: H1N1 // Add Comment »

Last year the Va. “expert panel” on BS checked in with its final report. There has been a fair amount of media coverage and Email chatter among sludge-warriors, but mostly over the way Synagro’s Virginia Biosolids Council put the spin on the Report’s conclusions.

I have had a close look at the Report, and it ain’t too good, in my opinion. Here’s a link to a long spew (Spew #16) on it back at the Mother Site: http://www.something-stinks.com/Feb09.htm

To re-state my conclusion verbatim:

“When has so much time been so badly wasted on such a listless and meaningless endeavor as this? Even by a state government. Hardly a single valid conclusion or useful recommendation in the whole 61 pages. In short: The HJR 694 report is as helpful as pigeon poop on the pump handle. I could have produced a far more informative, accurate, and helpful report by assigning the task to a group of high school students as a joint senior research project. But the troubling aspect is the deceit.”

This Report was cooked by the sludgers and then spun by Synagro. What a tag-team.

At the bottom of my rant I link to objections to the Report that were submitted jointly by two members of the panel: Henry Staudinger and Alan Rubin. If you don’t have time to wade through my drivel, drop down to the bottom and have a look at the way Satudinger/Rubin slammed the Report. That is definitely worth your time. (I would give you a direct link, but it’s been so long since I’ve fired up WordPress I don’t remember how to add the hyperlinks.)

Tags: Research, Legislation, Spin, Virginia // Add Comment »

I guess this lawyer, Ed Hallman, of the Atlanta law firm Decker, Hallman, Barber & Briggs, has done more for the anti-BS effort than any other single individual I know. And let me just quickly follow that up by saying that I know a lot of dedicated individuals in this game. People who have committed immense amounts of time, energy, and money to the goal of ending land-application of BS, and for no other reason than to see that the right thing is done, particularly with respect to the rural people who are forced to eat BS spread all over the Atlantic Coast by Synagro, Nuti-Blend, and many smaller players. A few of these sludge-warriors do this work as a part of their job and get some remuneration, but many of them are slogging away week after week without a dime of compensation for their efforts. Every one of them is a part of the effort that will — eventually — eliminate all land application of sewage sludge in this country.

[Read more →]

Tags: Players, Litigation, EPA, Spin, States, Maryland // Add Comment »

The most mundane, and painful, of human maladies — a tooth ache — has led me to a testable hypothesis that wind-blown sludge-dust produces asymptomatic infections in humans (and cows and pigs). It’s all laid out over at the Mother Site.

Tags: Strategies, Research, Disease // Add Comment »

In my day job, which pays the web hosting fees for this blog, I’m a patent lawyer. And the reason I tell you that is to make the point that the US Patent and Trademark Office and the US EPA must be running a race to see which one can do the most damage to the country. There are real issues here that go beyond the normal incompetence we expect from large bureaucracies; there are issues of dishonesty and misleading the public and Congress.

The other thing these agencies have in common is that they are powered by b’cratic mules who, by and large, are competent and who work hard to do a good job. But the damage is done by the high-paid, nano-cephalic, nematode managers, like Jon Dudas and Margaret Peterlin in the USPTO and Stephen Johnson, John Walker, and Alan Rubin of, or formerly of, the EPA, who could screw up a one-car funeral and call it a success.

Now comes a report from the Union of Concerned Scientists telling us what David Lewis, who was the victim of career and character assassination by the EPA, has been hollaring for years: the EPA heavies gag the front line scientists who deliver scientific results that contradict EPA policy. Here is a report from the LA Times. (Thanks, Jo.) Nowhere has this scientific censorship been more of a problem than in the EPA’s suppression of evidence that the EPA’s policy of spreading BS from sea to shining sea was a real, real bad idea.

Gagging people, particularly scientists with hard data, who raise valid criticisms of government policy is the way Stalin worked. It’s the way you breed contempt and distrust of the government. It’s the way you destroy a government.

Fortunately, the US has a federal judiciary, like Judge Alaimo in the US Southern District Court of Georgia and Judge Cacheris in the US Eastern District Court of Virginia, who are more than willing to spank these dangerous governmental thugs if we can just get them into court.

Tags: Players, EPA, Spin // 1 Comment »